I. Introduction

How could anyone kill lions, just for fun? Shouldn’t people pinpoint animals through the lens of a camera, not through the barrel of a gun? The mere mention of hunting often elicits immediate repulsion and contempt. However, is hunting necessarily bad?

II. Abstract

This paper will explore the role of the hunting tourism industry in the Tanzanian economy. It will analyze revenue and financial data, comparative studies of African governments, and government hunting regulations and policy. By peering into the regulation,
or lack thereof, of hunting tourism in Tanzania, this paper will argue that the hunting industry is unsustainable in its current state. While the industry is financially lucrative, those profits do not benefit local peoples due to governmental corruption. Furthermore, government mismanagement and lackadaisical regulations allow for unsustainable levels of animal harvesting that can result in declining wildlife populations.

III. Background

a. Terminology

As the term is used throughout this paper, ‘hunting tourism’ is the activity of visitors who come to Tanzania and go on safari with the goal of killing animals. ‘Photography tourism’ is the activity of quintessential visitors who go on safari to view and take photographs of animals. ‘Big game’ refers to large mammals such as lions, cape buffalo, and elephant, that are often sought after by hunters. An ‘outfitter’ is a company that organizes and makes arrangements for people to come to Tanzania and go on hunting safaris. A ‘quota’ is a limit, set by the Tanzanian government, on the number of animals that can be killed per year. This number varies depending on the animal species. I will use the term ‘hunting concession’ or ‘hunting block’ in this essay to describe a plot of land upon which people can hunt. These areas are allocated by the government and assigned to different hunting companies. I will use this vocabulary to describe the history and structure of the hunting tourism industry in Tanzania.

b. History

Tanzania is a country in east Africa where people from around the world journey to catch a glimpse of the ‘Big Five’ – lion, Cape buffalo, elephant, rhinoceros, and leopard. It became an independent state in 1961 when British-controlled Tanganyika and Zanzibar fused together to form Tanzania (Cooksey and Kelsall, 2011). However, since independence Tanzania has
struggled with low GDP, low per-capita incomes, and poor governance (Leader-Williams et al. 2009, p. 299). In the 1960s, Tanzania was the first country in Africa to instate the hunting block and quota system as a means of regulating the industry. Unfortunately, by the early 1970s the country faced rampant poaching and a general lack of control over the hunting industry. To combat this chaos, the government banned hunting in 1973. Hunting was reinstated in 1978, and the Wildlife Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism has had control over the hunting tourism industry since 1988 (Nelson and Agrawal 2009, p. 560). However, as will be expressed throughout this paper, government corruption has affected the Wildlife Division and resulted in poor management of the industry.

IV. Hypothesis One: Hunting tourism is a lucrative and potentially more sustainable source of revenue as compared to photography tourism.

This hypothesis will be supported first by breaking down the costs associated with hunting tourism to illustrate the substantial expenses that a single hunter pays to endeavor on a single hunting safari. Then, data reveals that revenue from hunting has been increasing over time, making it an increasingly lucrative industry. Finally, quantitative data presented will display that hunting tourism yields more revenue per capita than photography tourism.

i.) Costs Associated with Hunting Safaris

Tanzania earns a profit from hunting tourism because the Department of Wildlife collects fees from hunters and outfitters. There are numerous fees required to venture on a hunting safari. First, there are game fees charged based on the type and number of animals wounded and/or killed. These can range from US$10 for a small bird to upwards of US$7500 for an elephant. Observer fees are charged for those who stay on a camp site and do not partake in hunting
activities. Each hunter pays daily fees to the outfitter, of which a fraction gets sent to the State. Each hunter is also required to pay a permit fee that grants him/her permission to hunt in Tanzania. Outfitters pay annual block fees to lease a concession of land (Cauldwell 2004, p. 117). These various fees accumulate and vary depending on the length of the trip, but the cost of a hunting safari ultimately ranges from about US$10,000 to over US$200,000. A typical hunting safari costs about US$50,000 (Baker 1997, p. 309). In contrast, a typical photography safari costs about US$1200 as of 1996 (Wade et al. 2001, p. 98). The costs associated with hunting maintain the industry, which continues to grow from year to year.

*The cost of killing a single elephant is multiple thousands of dollars, due to the size and need for species protection.*

ii.) Hunting tourism revenue has increased over time.
This table illustrates how from 1988 to 1993, the amount of money charged in fees and the total earnings from hunting tourism in Tanzania both increased. As of 2003, the Selous Game Reserve, the largest hunting game reserve in Tanzania, raised US$3.576 million from hunting tourism. For comparison, Selous Game Reserve raised US$1.028 million in 1988, representing a substantial increase in revenue over this 15-year period (Cauldwell 2004, p. 114). While this data only represents a single game reserve in Tanzania, because it is the largest hunting area in Tanzania I am applying this data to illustrate the increase in nationwide revenue from hunting tourism over time.

iii.) Hunting tourism brings in more revenue per capita than photography tourism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of visit</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Average spending per person in US$</th>
<th>Total US$ spent in millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vacation/leisure</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunting</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other leisure</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting friends</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others/not stated</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>279,600</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As illustrated by this chart from 1996, only 600 hunting tourists generated US$21 million, each paying an average of US$35,000. In contrast, substantially more photography tourists – 70,000 to be precise – each paying an average of US$1200 were required to generate US$84 million for Tanzania (Wade et al. 2001, p. 98). It would still require 17,500 photography tourists to generate the same amount of money that a mere 600 hunting tourists generated, due to the discrepancy in average spending per tourist. This reveals that per capita (per person), hunting tourism generates more revenue.

Additionally, the Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism earned about US$10.5 million in direct payments from hunting in 2001, which marks a large increase from $1.5 million in earnings in 1989. Commercial hunting is therefore the Wildlife Division’s primary source of revenue (it is important to note that the Wildlife Division is not responsible for management of Tanzania’s national parks) (Nelson and Agrawal 2008, p. 560).

As this data shows, revenue from hunting tourism has increased since the ban was lifted in 1978. (There is little data before 1988 because from 1978-1988 the hunting industry was not monitored by the Department of Wildlife). As opposed to photography tourism which generates less revenue per capita, a single hunter can bring in large sums of money that help support Tanzania’s economy. Therefore, hunting tourism is, and continues to be, a significant source of revenue for Tanzania.
A lion walks by a photography tourist vehicle on safari, Ngorongoro Conservation Area.

Many photography safari vehicles lined up to view wildlife. This photograph displays the large density of photography tourists that visit parks in Tanzania.
V. Hypothesis Two: Governmental mismanagement has prevented the hunting industry from becoming sustainable.

This argument elucidates that hunting tourism has the potential to be both sustainable and lucrative – indeed, as I have just shown, it is already a lucrative industry – yet is hindered from doing so due to governmental corruption and mismanagement. There are claims that scientists and hunters alike have made, suggesting that hunting tourism has numerous benefits over photography tourism (Baker 1997, p. 307-308). These critics cite that hunting tourism is:

1. less ecologically destructive: Hunters require fewer accommodations and less infrastructure, thus leaving a smaller ecological footprint upon departure.

2. brings in more revenue per tourist, as detailed in hypothesis one.

3. allows inaccessible areas to develop a profit: wildlife-rich areas are often inaccessible to normal tourists due to poor transportation and lack of infrastructure. Hunters also allow less aesthetically-pleasing areas to earn a significant profit, resulting in more dispersed benefits of tourism.

4. helps manage overpopulation of certain species: Selective killing of overpopulated herds can help maintain ecosystem biodiversity and prevent damage to the natural habitat.
5. deters poachers

*This photograph of a luxury hotel in a wildlife management area reveals the type of infrastructure constructed in parks to support photography tourists. Hunting tourists do not require such established accommodations.*

While hunting tourism has the potential to be more sustainable and beneficial than photography tourism, hunting is not better in its present state. The Tanzanian government has been repeatedly described as highly centralized and weakly accountable. In contemporary Tanzania, “public resources are widely and systematically used for private accumulative or patronage purposes” (Nelson 2012, p. 364). Amplified by economic liberalization in the 1990s, systemic corruption infected the government as businessmen struck negotiations with public leaders and government transparency plummeted (Leader-Williams et al. 2009, p. 301).
With regards to the hunting industry, corruption even enveloped hunting quotas and hunting block allocation. Wildlife population counts have not been reliably nor meticulously calculated. For example, when two new hunting blocks were created in 1994 in the Mkomazi Game Reserve, the Tanzania Wildlife Conservation Society estimated that the count of lions was inflated by 300% (Baker 1997, p. 314). Not only are the scientific data collections themselves unreliable, but also the quota that the government sets to limit the number of animals killed are not based on recent, let alone accurate, population data. Quotas are often arbitrarily set without considering the actual number of animals alive and how many could be reasonably killed without threatening the population. This flagrant disregard for scientific decision making has resulted in four or five times the number of animals killed (Baker 1997, p. 315).

In addition, Tanzania’s process for hunting concession allocation provides a venue for nepotism. Tanzania is the only country in eastern and southern Africa without competitive bidding for hunting block allocation (Benjaminsen et al. 2013, p. 1100). This means that instead of requiring outfitters to compete through the market for areas of land, plots are allotted at the discretion of government officials. Because blocks are not awarded to the most deserving and financially savvy companies, inexperienced outfitters are often given land on which to operate hunting business. This provides opportunities for corruption: among two new hunting blocks established in 1994, one was given to the son of Tanzania’s Director of Wildlife and both went to companies with no prior experience in the hunting business (Baker 1997, p. 315). Without competition, hunting concessions are also leased at far below market prices for long periods, resulting in major Government revenue losses that accumulate over time (Leader-Williams et al. 2009, p. 306).
Therefore, there is intense government mismanagement of the hunting industry in Tanzania. Yet, this does not mean that hunting tourism can never be sustainable. Indeed, a study by Packet et al. in 2010 found that the population impacts of trophy hunting could be minimized if quotas restricted lion hunting to males five years and older. However, the Tanzanian government’s corrupt management system is not conducive to sustainable hunting. Because government corruption impacts the creation of quotas and hunting blocks, resulting in industry mismanagement and unsustainability, hypothesis two is supported.

VI. Hypothesis Three: Decision making power in the hunting industry is centralized in the government due to corruption.

The final hypothesis explains that corruption causes centralization of the lucrative hunting industry. This will be clarified first by examining comparative studies on east African governments, and then examining a proposed, but never implemented, Tanzanian policy to decentralize and improve management of the hunting industry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value of Centralized Commercial Utilization of Wildlife on Community Lands</th>
<th>Transparency of Procedures for Allocation of Wildlife Use (Hunting) Concessions</th>
<th>Overall Governance Transparency</th>
<th>Disincentives for Central Authorities to Devolve Authority over Wildlife</th>
<th>Level of Devolution Carried Out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As illustrated by this chart, the Tanzanian government is found to have a low level of transparency for hunting concession allocation and general governance, along with a low level of
devolution, as compared to neighboring countries (Nelson and Agrawal 2008, p. 576). However, the government began to acknowledge the intense centralization and lack of local participation in the hunting industry. To resolve these issues, the government proposed a Revised Draft Management Plan for Tourist Hunting in 1995. The goal of this policy was to encourage local communities to play an integral role in the quota-setting and allocations decision-making process on their land. In turn, they would benefit financially. Three of the largest goals of the policy were:

1.) Community benefit: “the sharing of benefits and revenues with rural communities from hunting carried out on their land” (Tanzania Department of Wildlife 1995, p. 5).

2.) Sustainable quotas: develop hunting limit numbers to “promote trophy quality on a scientific basis” (Tanzania Department of Wildlife 1995, p. 4).

3.) Open and equitable allocation of hunting blocks through a tender (bidding) system

Unfortunately, this policy was never implemented due to a lack of political motivation to reform the hunting industry. The lucrative nature of the hunting industry gives corrupt public officials the opportunity to accumulate private wealth. This, paired with the low government transparency and devolution in Tanzania helps explain the lack of political motivation to reform the hunting industry. Indeed, turning over control to locals necessarily involves losing power over the hunting profits. In summation, “where the value of wildlife is of high economic importance and institutional levels of corruption are also high, it is likely that policy-makers will face strong disincentives to devolve control over wildlife to local communities or to introduce more transparent systems of wildlife governance” (Nelson 2009, p. 4).

Although evidence corroborates the governmental corruption plaguing the industry and preventing benefits from trickling down to locals, this hypothesis is only partially supported.
There is an utter lack of recent data and public information about the intensity of hunting industry regulation. It is also difficult to trace revenue from hunting tourism; therefore, it is difficult to know if local communities are receiving any financial benefits. Much of the research is also qualitative rather than quantitative, so measures of corruption are variable from study to study. Because of these hesitancies, this hypothesis is potentially, but not strongly, supported.

VII. Conclusion

Ultimately, hypothesis one and two were supported by the evidence outlined, but hypothesis number two is only potentially supported. The Tanzanian government is plagued by systemic corruption that prevents the substantial earnings from hunting to trickle down to local communities. Government centralization, driven by corruption, over the industry leads to mismanagement. This prevents hunting from being sustainably managed. Subsequently, wildlife is threatened due to this poor management.

a. Needs for the future

In order to make hunting tourism a viable and sustainable industry that could both support economic growth and maintain ecological balance, the following criteria should be met:

1.) Science-determined quota: informed by sound population data.

2.) Transparent revenue collection: To prevent accumulation of profit for personal gain by corrupt officials.

3.) Fair distribution of revenue to locals: to help decentralize the industry away from the hands of corrupt officials, and bring benefits to the communities upon whose land these hunters trek.
4.) Competent management: At the government level, in order to create a strict framework that controls the number and type of animal killed, who is awarded a hunting concession, and how profits are allocated.

Until these needs are met, the industry will continue to bring in money but only for the benefit of corrupt government officials and only at the expense of wildlife and local peoples. While it is controversial, the hunting industry has the potential to fuel the economy across socioeconomic levels without decreasing wildlife populations, if it is properly managed.
Bibliography


