
A seemingly untouched landscape that was once occupied by the Meru people before they were evicted from the land as a result of the establishment of Meru National Park, a protected area that still bears their name.

Nani Friedman and Adam O’Reagan
October 20, 2017
Parks and Peoples: Dilemmas of Protected Area Conservation in East Africa

Word Count: 5431
Introduction

The phenomena of globalization and conservation have happened fairly simultaneously; in fact the two processes often appear indistinguishable. The end of the European era of communism came with the breakdown of state-centered development (Igoe 2004: 11). As a result, the past number of decades have seen a rapid increase in the creation of NGOs globally. While NGOs involve themselves in a multitude of social issues, one of the most prominent, and the one that will be the focus of this paper, is that of conservation. These organizations are concerned not only with domestic efforts of environmental protection, but also with similarly-framed goals in developing nations such as Tanzania. Many of these agencies are large-scale: they have multi-million or even billion dollar endowments and span various countries and often continents. The globalized nature of big international NGOs (henceforth BINGOs) prompts the question: how well connected can transnational corporations be toward the people and places they claim to represent? In the following essay, we provide insight into this issue by examining two BINGOs--the African Wildlife Foundation and The Nature Conservancy--and their impact on land rights in Northern Tanzania. The legal designation of land is a highly debated topic in Tanzania primarily due to historical conservation projects. The creation of protected areas and parks have all-too-often left native people dispossessed of the land they once occupied and forced to move elsewhere. In the following analysis, we will answer the question: How do BINGOs impact the land rights of pastoralists in Northern Tanzania? To do so, we will be testing our inquiry against the following three hypotheses:

1. BINGOs encourage local communities to secure their land rights through the processes and programs of the Tanzanian government.
2. BINGOs collaborate with local groups of pastoralists to support their priorities and secure their land rights.

3. BINGOs shift the decision-making power about land designation and occupancy to foreign investors and donors.

The paper will begin with an introduction to the privatization of land in Tanzania, and why this issue is of such urgency in the here and now. Subsequently, we will delve into our case studies, first by evaluating the African Wildlife Foundation’s establishment of Wildlife Management Areas and then by considering The Nature Conservancy’s advocacy for Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy. Using these narratives, we will then return to our hypotheses to see how our case studies either support or refute each one. The paper will close with insight into the limitations of and what we can learn from a study like this.

**Background on the Privatization of Land**

To begin a discussion of stakeholders influencing pastoralists’ land rights in Northern Tanzania, it is necessary to put the discussion in historical context. Why are land rights necessary, and why are they at stake in this moment?

Tanzania began the process to formally privatize land on a large scale in 1985, following pressure from international financial institutions and donors to do so. This policy shift resulted in a defined National Land Policy in 1995, and a Land Act and Village Land Act in 1999. The Land Act increased the federal government’s authority on Reserved Land (such as protected areas, game and forest reserves, land set aside for public utilities and highways, among others) and General Lands (an ambiguous category, but often referring to urban areas) (Sundet 2005: 3).
Under the Land Act, land is managed under *leasehold tenure*, in which the national government maintains land ownership but by leasing it, authorizes its occupancy and use. The Village Land Act has a very different effect, as it provided a basis for the decentralization of power to a local level. Once a village has been titled (approved by the national government), the Village Land Act grants village authorities the rights to manage land tenure, planning and resource management. This establishes *customary tenure* over the land, in which land is owned communally, strengthening community rights over the land itself. The procedural guidelines for the land laws became clarified in 2005 with the Strategic Implementation Plan for the Land Laws in 2005 and the Land Planning Act in 2007.

Prior to the 1980s, land in Tanzania was typically shared under communal tenure and land management systems. Privatization as a concept and the separation between human systems and natural systems in itself is a foreign concept to Tanzania, one that is based on Western concepts and ideologies of land use. As such, the spread of neoliberal economic policies within Eastern Africa not only had a significant impact on the land tenure system in Tanzania, but on culture surrounding the way land is viewed and used as well.

In this paper, we focus on the land rights of pastoralists because they are at particular risk, and they share land with several endangered species of particular interest to international conservation organizations. While dispossession of pastoralists from their land is not a new phenomenon, they currently face threats to their land tenure due to a) the growth of protected area conservation, b) an increase in land grabbing and foreign agricultural/tourism investment, c) the state’s incentivization of agriculture, and d) the effects of a rapidly growing population.
Case Studies

The African Wildlife Foundation (abbreviated from here on as AWF) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) are massive transnational organizations that are at the helm of exceptional financial and political power. In order to address the aforementioned hypotheses, we have developed a set of research criteria to familiarize ourselves with these organizations and their goals; we will investigate organizational history and size, primary funding sources, the policies and programs promoted and implemented by the organizations, and local partnerships and/or local opinions on their initiatives.

The African Wildlife Foundation

The African Wildlife Foundation was founded in 1961, the same year that Tanzania declared itself an independent nation. The simultaneity of these two events was not a coincidence. Rather, following the independence movement European interest groups became concerned about the survival of big game in an autonomous African state. As a result, “international conservation organizations like WWF and AWF were conceived as...politically acceptable vehicles with which to continue to influence African conservation with Euro-American ideals” (Sachedina 2008: 318). Europeans mistrusted Africans to preserve the landscapes in a way they deemed suitable; thus, the conservation movement was born. Of course, the AWF has evolved over time, departing from its founding consciousness by responding to the political, social, and environmental climates of the regions in which it operates. However, it is significant to name the conception of the organization for what it is: a European scheme to continue political intervention in a theoretically postcolonial nation. Contemporarily, the AWF
remain focused on wildlife—though the lands in which they operate are or have been populated by humans—which is evident in the nature of their mission statement. “African Wildlife Foundation’s mission is to ensure wildlife and wild lands thrive in Africa,” (AWF Website accessed 2017) shows in bold across the AWF’s homepage online. Further, the site abounds with photos of elephants, rhinoceroses, and hippopotamuses. Information about their involvement with people and communities is not emphasized in the same way as AWF’s work with endangered species. Surveying the rhetoric and representation of media is important; these trends tell us what organizations want to convey to a wide, online audience. In the case of the AWF, theirs is a message centering their work with wildlife and its protection instead of people and their livelihoods. That being said, we cannot argue that the rhetoric implemented in sources such as the AWF’s website conclusively support or refute any of our three hypotheses without further information on the actual actions and motivations taken by the AWF. Consequently, our next step was to turn to the money: where does funding coming from and who supplies it?

Now the largest conservation organization working exclusively in Africa, the AWF operates in thirteen countries across the continent. The breadth of the organization requires immense fiscal assets; in fact, the AWF has substantially grown economically over the nearly six decades since its founding. Today, it has the fourth largest annual expenditure among BINGOs globally (Scholfield and Brockington 2008: 20). Funding comes from various players, the largest actor that funds the AWF being foreign governmental agencies. As seen in Figure 1, twenty-five percent of the AWF’s total funding comes from sectors of the U.S. government alone; eighteen percent from non-U.S. public sector groups. This makes up an aggregate forty-three percent of the BINGO’s $40 million revenue (AWF Annual Reports 2016).
The irreplaceable role of foreign governments, most significantly the U.S. Government, in financing the AWF is striking. Though a plethora of distinct agencies provide this monetary support (as illustrated by Figure 2), the relationship between the AWF and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) warrants the most scrutinization for the purposes of this essay. What began as a much smaller organization has expanded into the massive corporation we see today largely due to engagement by the USAID. Beginning in the late 1980s, the AWF rolled out a series of campaigns that merited the USAID’s interest and, in turn, its money. Over the subsequent decades, the USAID has poured millions of dollars into programs it wants to see implemented in countries such as Tanzania. In fact, in my
own visit to Tanzania, I saw this partnership manifested at the entrance to Tarangire National Park. One panel in particular caught my attention, as shown below:

![Figure 3: An informational panel regarding the AWF and USAID’s involvement in Tarangire National Park at the park’s entrance.](image)

This panel serves as a symbol of the intimate relationship of the AWF and the USAID and an example of their collusion in projects such as creating and maintaining Tarangire National Park. The USAID continues to be an important partner of the AWF, as it has been throughout the past few decades. One may ask: why is a public agency focused on international development so
intrinsically tied to an organization concerned with conservation? There is much scholarly
discussion surrounding the interrelated economic, social, and ecological forces shaping these two
issues.

One of the ways that the topics of conservation and development converge is through the role that BINGO’s play in the Tanzanian public sector, a theme also present in the panel shown above. The marriage of the USAID and the AWF informs this assertion. Because the USAID operates internationally, it is concerned with how its partners present themselves in foreign countries. The better the relationship an organization has with the government of a foreign country, the more reputable the organization appears to the USAID and the more likely the USAID is to provide them with funding. The AWF’s economical proximity makes sense, then. The financial incentives offered by the USAID may very well influence who the BINGO sides with and who they listen to. If the AWF is functioning at an international level, affiliating so closely with national governments, how representative of small-scale, community interests can they really be? Patrick Bergin, CEO of the AWF, put it quite candidly: “Basically, the AWF is becoming an extension arm of the USAID in Africa” (Brockington et. al. 2011: 134).

Figure 5: Wildebeests drink from a watering hole in Tarangire National Park. Maasai Pastoralists once grazed their cattle in this area before the creation of the national park barred them from the area.
As conservation has progressed over the last half century, a new community-oriented movement has emerged. The reframing of conservation, emphasizing the people it most pointedly impacts, has put pressure on BINGOs and African governments alike to devolve authority over protected lands to those who live on them (while the historical alternative has been eviction of the land’s previous occupiers). One of the programs that has thus emerged out of recent legislation such as the Wildlife Policy of 1998 is Wildlife Management Areas (henceforth WMAs). WMAs allow governmental actors to draw new boundaries around villages, incorporating various groups into a newly designated “area.” The conglomeration of communities elect a new leadership team, which influences local policy concerning wildlife and tourism schemes. Theoretically, the villages incorporated into WMAs should simultaneously reap the economic benefits from tourism that the area provides; however, in praxis this is often not the case.

Each WMA requires an NGO sponsor to help with bureaucratic and financial challenges of their creation. This is where the AWF comes in. Subscribing to the new community-oriented vision of conservation, the AWF has subsidized the establishment of three different WMAs in Tanzania: Makame, Enduiment, and Burungue. During our time in Tanzania, we visited and stayed in the Burungue WMA at the Mramboi Tented Lodge. The owner of the lodge, a man who has grown up in Tanzania named Willie Chambulo, spoke to us about his opinions on the current state of WMAs in the country. His concerns echoed much of the research we had done prior to our visit. While WMAs push a rhetoric of devolution and community-advancement, the government maintains control over much of the profits made even when legally ordered not to. As WMAs are a government-backed initiative, the AWF’s sponsorship of various WMAs only
reflects the close connection between the AWF and the Tanzanian state. James Kahurananga, former AWF Senior Representative in Tanzania, stated: “We cannot openly challenge the government as the other NGOs and tour operators would like us to do. We cannot be activists against the government” (Igoe et. al. 2007: 549). Kahurananga pithily articulates a theme of the AWF consistently allying with the state regardless of impact on communities and livelihoods. The AWF cannot be an “activist” group because that would put their relationship with the Tanzanian government, and the funding it receives from USAID, at risk.

Willie Chambulo’s speech was insightful; we could not have glimpsed a better summary of the current state affairs without such personal testimony. That being said, we also wanted to draw on evidence from local community members. Since we did not gather any ethnographic evidence besides Willie’s while travelling, we relied on anecdotal evidence present in scholarly literature to inform our narrative. The testimony of those living within WMAs established in part by the AWF is sparse. That which we did find supports Chambulo’s narrative of neglect. Two villages in Burungue claimed they never accepted involvement in a WMA. It was imposed on them without their formal approval. Additionally, various villages in the Enduimet and Makame WMAs were not informed of the border regulations before their incorporation. This lead to legal issues faced by community members moving outside the WMA (Sachedina, 2008). Synthesizing the sources we could collect, the case studies in the literature as well as Willie’s personal commentary convey a sense of disregard and paternalism in how WMAs, their sponsors, and the government treat the communities involved.
The Nature Conservancy

The Nature Conservancy is also a substantial international conservation organization, with an annual revenue of $955,000,000 a year (The Nature Conservancy Annual Reports 2014, 2015, 2016). Founded in 1951, the organization currently holds $6,700,000,000 in assets and liabilities, such as land. According to a Forbes ranking in 2011, TNC has the largest revenue and the most private support of any US environmental organization (Forbes 2011).

TNC is predominantly funded (60%) by private contributions; those contributions are donations by individuals, foundations, corporations, other organizations and bequests. In contrast to the AWF, only 11% of TNC’s annual revenue comes from government grants (Annual Reports). As a result, the predominant audience that TNC is held accountable to are private donors, particularly individuals and foundations. While this has its own implications-- such as needing to appeal to donors’ value systems-- it does mean that the TNC is not as responsive to government agendas.
In Northern Tanzania, TNC carries out its work principally as a member of the Northern Tanzania Rangelands Initiative, a partnership of nine organizations working in the region. According to the initiative’s website, the group is “seeking a thriving landscape where people and wildlife coexist” (Northern Tanzania Rangelands Initiative: 2017). This narrative is unique from the rhetoric of traditional Western conservationist organizations, which often describe human systems and natural systems as competing with one another. This shift in rhetoric from the traditional conservationist canon not only acknowledges the stake that human communities have over land in the region, but it also implies a significant admission that human communities and wildlife can actually coexist in the same spaces.

Of the six “approaches” that the Northern Tanzania Rangeland Initiative (NTRI) is taking to fulfill their goal, two of them are directly related to the land tenure of pastoralists: a) “securing
communal rights to land and resources”, and b) “strengthening governance at village and community levels and improving natural resource management capacity” (Northern Tanzania Rangelands Initiative: 2017). Specifically, TNC and the NTRI do so by working with pastoralist communities to implement the land titling and customary right of occupancy process outlined in the 1999 Village Land Act. The website of the NTRI references several of the member organizations in their explanation of the program:

The Ujamaa Community Resource Team (UCRT), with financial and technical support from the Dorobo Fund for Tanzania (DF), The Nature Conservancy, Wildlife Conservation Society, and Maliasili Initiatives, has helped hunter-gatherer and pastoralist communities in the northern rangelands secure rights to their land by obtaining Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy (CCRO) – a different, yet effective approach for securing communal land rights. So far, UCRT has helped communities obtain seven CCROs across northern Tanzania. (Northern Tanzania Rangelands Initiative: 2017)

Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy (CCRO) are legal documents that establish a person or group’s right to occupy a plot of land. Under a communal land tenure system, right of occupancy is established rather than ownership, as the land is technically owned by the community. In order to assess the policies and programs that TNC (via the work of NTRI) supports in Tanzania, we must ask: what are the implications that CCROs have on pastoralists’ land rights? What does CCRO implementation look like, and what are the implications of TNC supporting such a program?

Certificates of Customary Rights of Occupancy can be obtained following an extensive Village Land Titling Process. The guidelines for the process were first written in the Village
Land Act legislation of 1999, and are defined more clearly with 2007 Land Use Planning Act, but the procedure has largely been realized through the individual implementation initiatives beginning in 2004 (Pederson 2010: 8). First, village borders must be demarcated and approved by the national government so that the village can receive a Certificate of Village Land from the national-level Ministry of Lands. The Certificate of Village Land grants authority to the village council to manage the land, which is the most significant step in the decentralization of land management outlined in the 1999 Village Land Act. The village must then adopt a formal land use plan (Ujamaa Community Resource Team 2014: 3). While these steps are important in fostering community control over its own land, for many communities the process of village titling is not sufficient to securing land tenure: according to the Ujamaa Community Resource Team, “the major advantage of the group CCRO is that it serves as a customary group ‘title’ to a defined communal land area, which makes it a stronger and less easily subdivided tenure instrument than the communal land designations under a [village] land use plan” (Ujamaa Community Resource Team 2014: 2). Furthermore, if a minority (perhaps hunter-gatherers or pastoralists) cannot gain a majority on the village council, their land tenure may be at risk. Once individuals and/or groups receive a CCRO, the certificate formalizes their right to occupy a plot of land for life. The Ujamaa Community Resource Team was the first organization to pilot group certificates, and found that the process for a group was faster and more straightforward than for individuals, and “the CCRO can be issued to minority group, which is often vulnerable to land grabs and competing interests” (Ujamaa Community Resource Team 2014: 3). From a land rights standpoint, there seems to be clear advantages to the use of CCROs. However, it is
important to note that these quotes come from the URCT and TNC’s publications and websites, which stress the initiative’s purpose and success stories in order appeal to donors.

The legal formalization of land rights in East Africa has long been the topic of scholarly discussion, especially following the 1999 legislation. The purpose and advantage of initiatives like CCROs has already been discussed. However, scholars such as Pedersen and Gastorn also speak to several major issues with the laws and their implementation. For example, critics disapprove of the way in which the plan prioritizes economic growth to the extent that it “may be incompatible with improved tenure security” (Pedersen 2010: 8). The plan itself criticizes “pastoralists and small-scale farmers for not contributing to agricultural productivity”, a stance which people fear “could lead to further expropriation of land for investment purposes” (Pedersen 2010: 8). Pedersen cites experts from the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development in revealing the lack of funding from within the Tanzanian government to carry out the land titling process: “It is estimated that [the Strategic Implementation of the Land Laws] will cost over 300 billion TSH, of which only about 3 billion are foreseen to come from the ordinary government budget. Consequently, the remaining 297 billion will have to come from outside the government budget” (Pedersen 2010: 7). As a result, implementation has largely been completed on a project-by-project basis, managed and controlled by donors and foreign agencies.

Furthermore, there has been limited knowledge and information sharing at the local level, making the bureaucratic process widely inaccessible. Access to necessary procedural information is restricted and governmental agencies have disseminated little information about how to complete the process. A study by the Tanzania Land Policy Action Node found that the “slow
pace of registration among landowners is attributed to several factors including the presence of few experts at district and village level; inadequate information on land registration processes; and lengthy registration procedures” (Shabani 2014: 3).

Therefore, while TNC’s support of CCROs could be seen as tacit support of the Tanzanian government's land use policies despite significant criticism and challenges, it can also be viewed as fulfilling a significant need that is not being filled by the government. By providing funding, TNC is contributing to the $297 billion TSH funding gap for land titling. TNC’s participation in the process, although potentially strengthening problematic policies, is actually attempting to solve the problematic implementation challenges, working in a practical way to secure land rights for pastoralists.

When examining other potential limitations of the CCRO program, I did not find literature about how CCROs hold up in court when competing interests arise. I could not find evidence of their legitimacy being tested, although legal precedent and a strong justice system are important steps toward solidifying the established rights of land title holders. Furthermore, CCROs are not a mechanism that can be used by pastoralists living in communities that are governed by that Land Act rather than the Village Land Act. For example, when I asked Lesikar, one of the drivers on our trips, about the potential for a CCRO for his family’s Maasai community, he told me that it was not possible because they live within the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. Pastoralists living in Reserved Land (such as protected areas, in the case of Lesikar’s family) or General Land live in areas governed by the 1999 Land Act. As such, communal titling processes are not an option for land security.
Finally, we also must acknowledge that TNC primarily serves as a *funder* for a local organization, the Ujamaa Community Resource Team, in its CCRO implementation. It is possible that local partnerships, especially due to the size of TNC, are a source for the organization to truly be allying themselves with the needs of local pastoralist communities. However, Jim Igoe’s work focuses on the ways in which local pastoralist organizations have changed over time and that they no longer represent the needs of the communities they claim to represent:

Donor desire to fund civil society institutions has actually undermined the formation of civil society in pastoralist communities… NGO leaders become gatekeepers between western donors and the communities that they wish to assist. More energy is spent in accommodating donor ideas and meeting reporting requirements than in empowering local people. Communities become commodities of an international NGO industry, rather than active participants in Tanzanian civil society. (Igoe 2003: 881)

In his paper, Igoe is specifically referencing the 25 pastoralist organizations claiming to represent the Maasai and Barabaig communities in Kenya and Tanzania that emerged between 1990 and 1995, following a process of neoliberalization that established a national registration process for NGOs. While Igoe may not specifically be speaking to newer organizations such as the Ujamaa Community Resource Team, a central question rings true: to what extent do locally based organizations actually represent the interest of local communities? We will discuss this more in an assessment of our second hypothesis.
Assessment of the Hypotheses

Using the previously developed information about the two organizations, we can now assess our three major hypotheses. To begin, we hypothesized that BINGOs (Big International NGOs) encourage local communities to secure their land rights through the processes and programs of the Tanzanian government. There is a long history of collaboration between the AWF and the Tanzanian government, facilitated by the expectations of USAID. The AWF facilitates state-backed Wildlife Management Areas, regardless of significant criticism of WMAs among local villages and community leaders. The Nature Conservancy provides funding for the implementation of Village Land Titling and Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy, processes outlined in the nation’s land laws. This funding support is necessary, as the state does not allocate sufficient funds for it to be completed. Furthermore, given the literature that we have reviewed, it appears that Village Land Titling and CCROs are in the interests of pastoralists and are a form of securing their land rights. As such, we accept our first hypothesis-- that these organizations back state-run methods of land tenure--following an analysis of both of our case studies. We can also conclude that in fact, the Tanzanian government relies on NGOs, foreign governments, and world financial institutions to implement some of its land policies. However, our hypothesis states that the NGOs work “to secure land rights through the processes and programs of the Tanzanian government.” In reality, the implications of this statement are complicated, as the government often does not work in the interests of pastoralists (and may not actually secure their land rights). As such, a nuanced discussion of this hypothesis must recognize the inherent contradiction in the statement.
In our second hypothesis, we stated that BINGOs may collaborate with local groups of pastoralists to support their priorities and secure their land rights. In the case of the AWF, it is impossible for the organization to collaborate with pastoralist “activist” groups that take an antagonizing stance toward the Tanzanian government. Furthermore, there is considerable resistance among villages in WMAs created by the AWF. Finally, we did not find any evidence of partnerships with any local organizations that uphold the opinions of pastoralist sentiment. All the evidence we found rejects our hypothesis; still, in order to completely assess it we believe a more comprehensive ethnographic study must be done in order to reveal the stance of impacted communities in greater depth. Therefore, we tentatively reject the second hypothesis in regards to the AWF case study. On the other hand, it is clear that The Nature Conservancy does have partners through the Northern Tanzania Rangelands initiative (such as the Ujamaa Community Resource Team) that are based in Northern Tanzania and work on a local scale with communities to implement CCROs. However, Igoe’s literature about the disconnect between pastoralist NGOs and pastoralist communities in the past causes us to question if local partnerships reflect collaboration with pastoralists in ways that honestly represent their experience and increase their agency. As a result, we conclude that specifically for the case study of The Nature Conservancy, our hypothesis is *maybe* true, but more evidence is needed. Because we tentatively rejected the second hypothesis in reference to one case study and stated that it was possibly true for our second case study, we can see that the hypothesis may be true for some NGOs but not others. Additionally, variety in the needs of pastoralists makes it especially difficult to generalize that an organization is “working with” or “supporting” pastoralists in the region. Furthermore, we can see that our first two hypotheses are related: the need for the AWF to appear in support of the
Tanzanian government’s programs and processes actually prevents it from collaborating with local pastoralist communities that are at odds with the state’s agenda.

Lastly, we hypothesized that BINGOs shift the decision-making power about land designation and occupancy to foreign investors and donors. The substantial funding that the AWF received from USAID, the US Department of State and other branches of the American government has caused speculation that the AWF can be seen as an extension of US foreign policy. Although the AWF is strongly influenced by the agenda of these American agencies, it is also clear that the agencies encourage the AWF to be complicit with Tanzanian state policies. To what extent, therefore, is the decision making power going to foreign agencies or being re-directed toward the Tanzanian government? Furthermore, both the USAID and the AWF have distinct presences in Tanzania, so distinguishing between the voices of the two organizations can be difficult. By examining the funding of TNC, we can see that the majority of the organization’s revenue comes from foundations and individual donors. However, there is no strong evidence to suggest that local needs are co-opted by foreign stakeholders in the case of TNC, although more research is necessary. In conclusion, although the AWF and TNC are clearly dominated by non-Tanzanian funding, we cannot accept or reject this hypothesis for either organization because we do not know the ways in which the BINGO’s interests are dictating the decision making or influencing policies in ways that contradict local (or the Tanzanian government’s) agendas.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have determined that these large international NGOs do have
supportive relationships with the Tanzanian government, which is absolutely vital to the discussion, especially because the state and pastoralists are often at odds. However, we were unable to generalize the extent to which the organizations collaborated with local communities and/or caused decision making to shift to foreign stakeholders. From our discussion of the final two hypotheses, however, we were able to derive more questions. To what extent can NGOs (large and small) be an advocate for local civil society and community initiatives, especially given the level of variation between communities? When foreign agencies or organizations fill deficiencies within the Tanzanian government, how does one prevent dependency and/or reduce the power of the foreign donor?

It is also worth noting that our analysis only covered two case studies, providing just a small snapshot of a dynamic world of large international conservation NGOs. Similarly, Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy and Wildlife Management Areas are not the only programs affecting land rights in Tanzania.

Finally, we noticed in our research that neoliberal policies in the 1980s not only paved the way for the privatization of land (and therefore the need for at-risk communities to secure their right to occupy their land), but they also caused a dramatic increase in the presence of NGOs in Tanzania. This finding is consistent with the major message in a recent publication called *Nature Unbound*, that “conservation and capitalism are allying mutually to reshape the world” (Brockington et. al. 2008: 4). In this way, we see the historical harm and modern-day challenges concerning land rights of pastoralists in Tanzania under a much broader context of globalization. Our research asks: who is not benefitting globalization? How are mounting neoliberal forces impacting marginalized livelihoods not only in Tanzania but across the globe.
Works Cited


